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Abstract. With the widespread deployment of automatic biometric recognition
systems, some security issues have been unveiled. In particular, face recognition
systems have been recently shown to be vulnerable to attacks carried out with
morphed face images. Such synthetic images can be defined as the fusion of the
face images of two (or more) different subjects. The associated risk lies on the
ability of multiple subjects to be positively verified with a single enrolled mor-
phed face image. As common texture based features have limited capabilities
to tackle this problem, we propose a novel method for morphed face image de-
tection, based on the computation of the differences between the landmarks of
a probe bona fide (i.e., captured under supervision) image of the attacker, and
the landmarks of the enrolled image (i.e., the suspected morphed image). In this
work, a new database is created for the experiments, comprising both bona fide
and morphed images created with two different morphing methods. The exper-
iments show that for the detection task, the proposed algorithm achieves Equal
Error Rates at 32.7%.
1 Introduction
Biometrics refers to the automated recognition of individuals based on their biological
and behavioural characteristics [1]. Due to their convenience, Face Recognition Sys-
tems (FRSs) are widely-used for user authentication, e.g. for Automated Border Control
(ABC) based on the biometric passport (ePass) as defined in [2]. The main advantage
of biometric systems over common authentication systems is the unique link, which
is established between the Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD), containing
the biometric reference, and the data subject (i.e. the owner of the electronic passport).
However, current research [3] [4] has revealed a weakness of the passport issuance pro-
cess, which allows to inject manipulated images into the biometric database, e.g. the
ePass. The key deficiency in the passport issuance process lies in the way the facial
picture of an applicant is processed. In many countries, the applicant provides a printed
facial image, which is scanned and then digitally transferred to the passport production
site. Thus, an artificial facial image, resembling two or more subjects in their visual
and feature representation (see Figure 1b), can be submitted to the passport issuance
authority. If the artificial image is used for verification, both constituting subjects can
be verified successfully. This type of attack is referred to as morphed face image attack.
(a) Subject 1 (b) Morph Subj. 1 + 2 (c) Subject 2
Fig. 1: Example of face morphing
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Fig. 2: Scheme for differential morphing detection
The feasibility of this attack was first analyzed in [3] [4] on a dataset of 12 mor-
phed face images on two Commercial-Of-The-Shelf (COTS) Face Recognition Systems
(FRSs), and verified recently in [5] [6] on a larger dataset of 450 morphed images. The
datasets used in [3] [4] [5] [6] were generated utilizing GIMP and GAP. In addition, a
theoretical framework for the estimation of the success of morphing attacks on a spe-
cific system was presented in [7].
In [5], a first detection system for morphed face images was proposed, based on
well-established multi-purpose image descriptors. The method aims at detecting mor-
phed face images without a bona fide reference, hence referred to as no-reference mor-
phed face image detection in the remainder of this article. A bona fide presentation is
defined in ISO/IEC 30107-3 as a “interaction of the biometric capture subject and the
biometric data capture subsystem in the fashion intended by the policy of the biometric
system” [8]. Among the analyzed feature extractors, Binarized Statistical Image Fea-
tures (BSIF) [9] with a filter of 11 × 11 pixels and 12-bit performed best on the given
dataset.
The morphed face image attack detection algorithm proposed in [5] focuses on digi-
tal samples, as used for ePass renewal in New-Zealand, where face images are uploaded
electronically. However, the application process of the ePass in many countries (e.g.
most of the European Schengen states) still requires a printed face image that will be
handed over to the public authority office during the application process.
Taking this real-world scenario of printed and scanned face images into account,
[6] focuses on the effect of the print-scan process of a digitally morphed face image
on FRSs and morphing detection. The print and scan process adds some noise and
granularity to the face image, which affects the performance of both FRSs and morphed
face image detection algorithms. Despite such noise, it was shown in [6] that morphed
face images pose a severe threat to face recognition systems even after printing and
scanning, and many well-established multi-purpose image descriptors are not suitable
for detecting ether digital nor printed and scanned morphed face images.
Ferrara et al. [10] proposed face demorphing for morph detection employing a
trusted live capture in addition to the questioned sample. Scherhag et al. [11] analyzed
multiple general purpose image feature extractors in this differential scenario. Further,
Hildebrandt et al. [12] suggest to employ generic image forgery detection techniques,
in particular multi-compression anomaly detection, to reliably detect morphed facial
images. Kraetzer et al. [13] evaluate the feasibility of detecting facial morphs with key-
point descriptors and edge operators. However for the current state of the art detection
accuracy is very limited and generalisation capabilities of detectors are yet unexplored.
In this paper we propose a novel framework for the detection of morphed face im-
ages based on facial landmarks. In contrast to previously proposed no-reference meth-
ods, we compare a bona fide face image with the passport image we want to classify
(see Figure 2). This approach will be referred to as differential morphing detection.
The required bona fide face image could be either captured at the ABC-Gate or during
the application process at the public authority office. In either scenario the assumption
holds that the capture process is semi-supervised (i.e. via video surveillance) or super-
vised (i.e. in the passport application office).
The paper is organized as follows: The differential morphed face image detection
framework is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3 we present the new morphed face
image database, and the experiments conducted with the framework are described in
Section 4. Final conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2 Proposed Algorithm
The algorithm is motivated by the observations made in [14], that meaningful landmarks
are suitable for face recognition. In addition, landmark based face recognition systems
are robust to ageing, which is an important property for passport scenarios [14]. The
position of each landmark of the morphed face image, lm(xm, ym), is situated between
the corresponding landmarks, li(xi, yi) and lj(xj , yj), of both constituting subjects, i
and j:
xm = (1− α)xi + αxj
ym = (1− α)yi + αyj ,
(1)
where α defines the ratio of the contribution of Subject j to the morph, and consequently
1 − α describes the contribution of Subject i. It can be assumed that the intra-subject
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Fig. 3: Facial landmarks and angle calculation
variance of landmarks extracted from bona fide images is smaller than the variance
between the landmarks of the morphed image and its contributing subjects. Based on
this assumption, two feature extraction methods are designed: (1) distance based, and
(2) angle based.
(1) Distance based: The landmarks of both images (bona fide image, Ib, and pass-
port image, Ip) are determined utilizing the facial landmark predictor of dlib [15], which
returns the absolute position of 68 facial landmarks (l0 . . . l67), as depicted in Figure 3.
In order to achieve a scaling-robust system, the landmarks are normalized to a range
between 0 and 1. To that end, the green and yellow dots depict the upper-left (0.0, 0.0)
and lower-right (1.0, 1.0) boundaries for the normalization. In the next step, the Eu-
clidean distance of the relative position of each landmark li between both images Ip
and Ib is calculated (depicted in red in Figure 4), resulting in a feature vector of length
2278, which referred to as distance features.
(2) Angle based: Depending on the face region, pose and expression, the position
of the landmarks varies. Even if the images utilized in this work are normalized accord-
ing to ICAO recommendations [2], minor pose variations and expressions can not be
completely avoided. Those minor changes in the positioning of the landmarks affect the
calculation of the distance, thereby decreasing the morphing detection accuracy. There-
fore, in order to achieve a more robust feature extractor, the angles of each landmark,
li, to a predefined neighbor (in order to obtain the most discriminative dependencies)
are calculated as lˆi (depicted in Figure 3). The corresponding angles of Ip and Ib are
compared as shown in Figure 4. In order to avoid unrealistic high differences when the
angles cross the horizontal line, the difference is calculated as:
d(lˆpi , lˆ
b
i ) = min(|lˆpi − lˆbi |, 360− |lˆpi − lˆbi |), i = 0 . . . 67, (2)
Fig. 4: Landmark based feature extraction
returning a positive difference between 0◦ and 180◦. The resulting feature vector has a
length of length 68 and will be referred to as angles features.
During this work, multiple classifiers have been tested. It turned out, that the classi-
fication task can not be solved by linear classifiers, e.g. linear Support Vector Machine
(SVM). Therefore, and in order to have a more comprehensive evaluation, three differ-
ent classifiers are employed:
Random Forest with 500 estimators.
SVM without kernel
SVM with a Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel
The best performance could be achieved employing an SVM with RBF kernel.
3 Databases
The databases created for previous works are either non-public, or do not comprise
enough independent bona fide images to carry out a fair evaluation. Thus, for this work,
a new database was constructed utilising two different morphing techniques. The new
database builds upon the publicly available ARface database [16], which comprises 136
subjects. In order to generate realistic morphs, all frontal faces with neutral expression
are selected3. The selected 493 images from 120 subjects are processed according to
the recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) [2]. For
the normalization process, the landmark detection algorithm of dlib [15] is employed
to determine the centers of the eyes, according to which the images are horizontally
aligned. Subsequently, the image is cropped according to [17] and downsized to 720×
960 pixels, which is 5 times higher than the minimal required resolution for passport
images.
For the experiments, the subjects are divided into two subsets: training and testing,
each comprising 60 subjects. While the first image of each subject is reserved for the
morphing attack creation, the remaining images are utilized as bona fide samples. The
3 In order to support reproducible research, the mapping of the images will be provided via
URLisremovedforthereviewprocess.
Table 1: Composition of created database
# Training Testing
Subjects 60 60
Bona Fide 215 223
Morphs 2703 2098
total composition of the database is depicted in Table 1. The morphs are generated
utilizing the dlib landmark detector [15] and delaunay triangulation and referred to as
OpenCV Morphs.
4 Experiments and results
The experiments conducted in this work are evaluated according the metrics for presen-
tation attack detection defined in ISO/IEC 30107-3 [8]:
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER): proportion of at-
tack presentations using the same Presentation Attack Instrument (PAI) species
incorrectly classified as bona fide presentations in a specific scenario.
Bona fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER): proportion of
bona fide presentations incorrectly classified as presentation attacks in a spe-
cific scenario.
In addition, the following metrics are reported:
BPCER10: BPCER observed at a fixed APCER of 10%.
Detection Equal Error Rate (D-EER): the operating point in which APCER
and BPCER are equal.
In addition to the aforementioned metrics and in order to evaluate the quality of the
generated database, the Mated Morph Presentation Match Rate as well as the Relative
Morph Match Rate (RMMR) [18] were calculated, which indicates the vulnerability
of the FRS with respect to the attack. Employing the Cognitec FaceVACS-SDK [19] a
ProdAvg-MMPMR of 96.7% ProdAvg-RMMR of 97.7% was computed for testing and
training set.
Due to the fact that we employ a differential morphing detection scheme, we obtain
many more distance-scores than samples. The number of bona fide comparisons is 315
for the testing set. The number of morph comparisons, which could be much higher, is
limited to 300 to obtained a balanced classifier.
The error rates (D-EER and BPCER10) for the classifiers are summarised in Table
2. Furthermore, the Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curves [20] are depicted in Figure
5.
In the DET-plot (Figure 5), higher error rates can be observed for the distance fea-
tures compared to the angle features. The linear SVM yields slightly higher error rates
compared to the SVM with RBF kernel, indicating a non-linearity of the problem.
Table 2: Performance of the proposed system
Classifier Features D-EER BPCER10
Random Forest
Distance 45.3% 76.6%
Angle 41.2% 67.3%
SVM (lin)
Distance 44.7% 83.0%
Angle 43.9% 87.0%
SVM (rbf)
Distance 44.1% 84.9%
Angle 32.7% 61.7%
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Fig. 5: Performance Evaluation of the analyzed detection algorithms
The best detection performance for all operating points is achieved by the SVM with
RBF kernel, yielding a D-EER of 32.7% and BPCER10 of 61.7%. The results indicate,
that some information about the morphing process can be derived from the landmarks,
but due to the low overall performance, the algorithms presented in this work are still
not applicable for real world applications. Thus our future work, will fuse landmark
based information with complementary information derived from the image texture.
5 Conclusions
In this work a novel approach for morphed face image detection has been presented.
Unlike previous detection methods, this work utilizes, in addition to the passport image
submitted, a trusted bona fide facial image from the claimed data subject. Employing
a Random Forest classifier, the differences of the angles between certain landmarks of
passport and bona fide image are compared, yielding a D-EER of 32.7%, a fusion of
both approaches might lead to lower error rate. The results achieved in this work are not
suited for operational deployment, but it is a first step towards reference based morphed
face image detection.
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